WI-FAB: attribute-based WLAN access control, without pre-shared keys and backend infrastructures by Pisa, Claudio et al.
WI-FAB: Attribute-Based WLAN Access Control, Without
Pre-shared Keys and Backend Infrastructures
Claudio Pisa
CNIT, Italy
claudio.pisa@uniroma2.it
Alberto Caponi
CNIT, Italy
alberto.caponi@uniroma2.it
Tooska Dargahi
CNIT, Italy
tooska.dargahi@uniroma2.it
Giuseppe Bianchi
University of Rome Tor
Vergata, Italy
giuseppe.bianchi@uniroma2.it
Nicola Blefari-Melazzi
University of Rome Tor
Vergata, Italy
blefari@ing.uniroma2.it
ABSTRACT
Two mainstream techniques are traditionally used to autho-
rize access to a WiFi network. Small scale networks usually
rely on the oﬄine distribution of a WPA/WPA2 static pre-
shared secret key (PSK); security hence relies on the fact
that this PSK is not leaked by end user, and is not dis-
closed via dictionary or brute-force attacks. On the other
side, Enterprise and large scale networks typically employ
online authorization using an 802.1X-based authentication
service leveraging a backend online infrastructure (e.g. Ra-
dius servers/proxies). In this work, we propose a new mech-
anism which does not require neither online operation nor
backend access control infrastructure, but which does not
force us to rely on a static pre-shared secret key. The idea is
very simple, yet effective: directly broadcast in the WLAN
beacons an encrypted version of the secret key required to
access the WLAN network, so that only the users which
possess suitable authorization credentials can decrypt and
use it. This proposed approach clearly decouples the man-
agement of authorization credentials, issued oﬄine to the
authorized end users, from the actual secret key used in the
WLAN network, which can thus be in principle changed at
each new user’s access. The solution described in the pa-
per relies on attribute-based encryption, and is designed to
be compatible with WPA2 and deployable within standard
802.11 management frames. Since no user identification is
required (access control is based on attributes rather than on
the user identity), the proposed approach further improves
privacy. We demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed so-
lution via a concrete implementation in Linux-based devices
and via relevant testing in a real-world experimental setup.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing number of smart mobile devices, mo-
bile users are willing to have ubiquitous access to the In-
ternet. As predicted by Cisco [7], the number of personal
mobile devices will grow to 8.2 billion by 2020. However,
the existing cellular network (i.e., 3G, 4G, LTE) is not able
to support this growing demand of mobile users. As a con-
sequence, the widely available WiFi systems are considered
to be the main choice for oﬄoading the data traffic [8, 27].
Cisco [7] predicted the amount of oﬄoaded traffic from 3G
and 4G to increase to 48% and 58%, respectively, by 2020.
However, open un-protected WLANs, deployed in several
public locations, are vulnerable against security attacks [24],
for which several protocols have been designed in order to
tackle this issue [14].
An important challenge in using WiFi connections is to
provide a secure and convenient way for user authentica-
tion and access control. Typically, upon connecting to an
open WiFi network, the user is presented with a splash page
that requires to authenticate or register. On the other side,
access control in protected WLANs is non-trivial: the user
needs credentials, which have to be obtained through an-
other channel or oﬄine, to connect to a protected network.
Although traditional security protocols, i.e., Wired Equiv-
alent Privacy (WEP) and WiFi Protected Access (WPA)
are prone to several security attacks [14, 17], these can be
prevented by employing WPA2, with e.g. IEEE 802.1X [6].
However, when a service provider deploys such advanced au-
thentication mechanisms, or even Radius-based authentica-
tion federations, it is required to setup and maintain online,
interactive authentication infrastructures. In this scenario,
an untrusted WiFi Access Point (AP) might threaten users’
privacy, since a curious service provider would be able to
track the clients connected to the APs [16].
We believe that attribute-based access control (ABAC)
[22] is a promising solution for providing secure, privacy-
preserving authentication and access control in such scenar-
ios. ABAC is an access control mechanism in which the
access of the users to a specific content/resource/object is
specified based on the attributes of the user (e.g., occupa-
tion). The main advantage of ABAC compared to the other
access control mechanisms, such as role-based or identity-
based access control, is its flexibility especially in dynamic
access control decisions, where there is no a priori informa-
tion about the users, and large scale scenarios [21].
Recently, several researchers tend to adopt Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) [25] to provide privacy and ABAC solu-
tions in several scenarios, such as online social networks [12],
cloud computing [23], and location-based services [18]. ABE
provides fine-grained access control over data through defin-
ing attribute-based access policies. In particular, Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [13], which is
an instantiation of ABE, allows the data owner to encrypt
data specifying expressive access control based on a set of
attributes. Only the users who have the right attributes in
their decryption keys, will be able to decrypt the ciphertext.
In this paper, adopting CP-ABE, we propose WI-FAB, an
Attribute-Based WLAN access control mechanism, without
pre-shared keys and backend infrastructures. In our pro-
posed approach, we introduce a clear separation between the
authentication and issuance infrastructure, and the Autho-
rization infrastructure. In particular, we encrypt the WPA2
secret, utilized to secure the WiFi connection, using CP-
ABE and then divide it into several chunks. We then insert
each chunk in the WLAN beacons and broadcast it in the
network. Only the users who can rebuild the information in-
cluded in beacons and decrypt it, and hence can retreive the
WPA2 secret, are authorized to connect to the network. To
the best of our knowledge, the proposed approach is the first
that does not require any pre-shared key. Through exten-
sive experimental results, we show that WI-FAB is secure,
efficient and scalable.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section we provide background knowledge on the
concepts that we adopt in our proposed approach.
Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [25], is a powerful public
key encryption scheme, in which encryption and decryption
are based on descriptive attributes (such as age, gender, or
occupation). Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(CP-ABE) [13] and Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(KP-ABE) [20] are the two main types of ABE. In CP-ABE,
the data owner enforces an access policy on the ciphertext.
A user will be able to decrypt the ciphertext, if and only if,
her decryption private key satisfies the defined access pol-
icy. While, in KP-ABE the access policy is bound to the
decryption key of the user. She is able to decrypt a cipher-
text if the attributes specified on the ciphertext matches her
key’s access policy. Since CP-ABE provides the data owner
with a means to have more control over the data, more re-
searchers have concentrated on adopting CP-ABE in several
applications [26]. In the following we provide explanation of
the CP-ABE basic functions:
• Setup. Taking a security parameter as input, it out-
puts the public parameter PK, and a master keyMSK.
• KeyGen. Taking a set of attributes SU , the master
key MSK and the public parameter PK, it outputs a
decryption key SKSU reflecting the given attributes.
• Encryption. Taking as input a message M , an access
policy Π, and the public parameter PK, it outputs the
ciphertext E.
• Decryption. Taking as input the ciphertext E that
is encrypted under the access policy Π, the decryption
key SKSU , and the public parameter PK, it outputs
the message M if and only if SU “satisfies” the access
policy Π.
ABE has several advantages compared to the other pubic-
key encryption methods [10]: (i) ABE provides fine-grained
access control over data through allowing the data owner
to define expressive access policies based on the attributes;
(ii) the proposed approaches based on ABE are scalable and
independent of the number of authorized users; (iii) ABE is
efficient in terms of communication, storage and key man-
agement overhead. This is due to the fact that there is no
need for sharing any secret between the parties.
Attribute-Based Access Control
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) [22, 19] is a flexible
access control method in which the acceptance or rejection
decision for accessing a resource is made based on the at-
tributes of the requester. ABAC is indeed efficient in terms
of communication overhead between the requester and the
resource owner. This is due to the fact that the two parties
do not need to agree on a pre-shared key to access the re-
source. Moreover, ABAC preserves the privacy of the users
in the sense that the access credentials are not bound to the
user identity. Instead, the resource owner only defines the
access policies for the resource, and the user will be autho-
rized to access the resource if and only if her credentials,
which are bound to her attributes (such as citizenship or
group membership) satisfy the access policy.
WPA2 Protocol
The Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) protocol [9] is a recti-
fication of the 802.11 standard, which is introduced in order
to address the security vulnerabilities of the Wi-Fi Protected
Access (WPA) protocol for wireless networks. WPA2 sup-
ports the use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in or-
der to provide data confidentiality and integrity. Moreover,
WPA2 provides both personal and Enterprise authentica-
tion capabilities [11]: in the personal authentication method,
WPA2 makes use of Pre-Shared Key (PSK), while, in the
Enterprise mode, the users need to be authenticated based
on the IEEE 802.1X.
IEEE 802.11 Beacon Management frames
The IEEE 802.11 standard [5] defines several subtypes of
management frames. Among these, Beacon frames are broad-
cast periodically by the access point to advertise its pres-
ence, provide the SSID (i.e. the name of the wireless net-
work) and announce its capabilities and other parameters
to other wireless devices within its range. These data in-
cluded in Beacons are enclosed in a sequence of field tuples
called Information Elements. Of specific interest for this
work are Vendor-Specific Information Elements, which are
used to carry information which is not explicitly defined in
the IEEE 802.11 standards.
Fountain Coding
Digital fountain (also known as fountain coding) first intro-
duced in 1998 in order to provide a reliable distribution of
bulk data to a large number of users [15]. Fountain coding
allows a data owner, who wishes to send a data consisting
of a sequence of m equal length packets, to send a stream
of distinct packets (called encoding packets or droplets) into
the network. The receiver will be able to reconstruct the
source data by receiving any subset of the encoding packets
composed of exactly m number of packets. Fountain coding
is reliable, in the sense that it guarantees all the intended
users will receive the data source. Moreover, it provides an
efficient and on-demand method of sending data to the user
in a lossy environment.
3. PROPOSED APPROACH
We have devised a privacy-preserving attribute-based ac-
cess control mechanism for resources which are protected by
a shared secret, leveraging the CP-ABE scheme proposed
in [13]. Figure 1 shows an overview of our proposed ap-
proach. We use CP-ABE to encrypt a secret that grants a
single access to a resource.
Figure 1: CP-ABE based proposed ABAC mecha-
nism
An authority A generates a master key MSK, a public key
for each attribute it wishes to support, and also a key SKSU ,
associated to a set of verified and appropriate attributes SU ,
for each user U .
Let KR be the secret that protects a single access to a
resource R, and Π the attribute-based policy that a user V
holding R wants to enforce on the access to this resource.
Then V encrypts KR using CP-ABE according to the policy
Π and publishes the encrypted secret C = ABEΠ(KR).
The users which own the keys whose set of associated
attributes satisfy the policy Π can successfully decrypt C
and obtain KR. KR can subsequently be employed to access
the resource R once.
3.1 WI-FAB
We employ the above-described access control mechanism
in a scenario in which the resource is a wireless network
protected by a WPA2 secret. We call the below-described
system WI-FAB, outlined in Figure 2. For each user U , an
authority A, which can verify a set of attributes SU of U ,
releases a private key SKSU . A WLAN service provider W
that trusts the authority A, for each of its access points AP
in which it wants to enforce the policy Π:
1. generates a new random secret KW
2. sets KW as the WPA2 secret of the AP
3. encrypts KW using CP-ABE and the policy Π, yielding
C = ABEΠ(KW )
4. sends C to nearby users in the IEEE 802.11 informa-
tion elements of the beacons
5. when a user successfully connects to AP , the here de-
scribed procedure starts again from point 1.
Figure 2: WI-FAB overview diagram
A user U who wishes to access the WLAN service provided
by W :
1. captures beacons (by scanning or sniffing) from the
access point AP
2. extracts the IEEE 802.11 information elements which
contain C
3. attempts to decrypt C using her key SKSU
4. if the decryption is successful, i.e. if the attributes in
SU satisfy the policy Π, then U holds KW
5. U generates a random MAC address for her wireless
interface
6. U employs KW to generate a WPA2 configuration and
connects to AP using the WPA2 protocol
Note that KW is used by the WPA2 protocol to generate
a per-client session key. Thus, when W generates a new
secret for an access point and sets it as the new WPA2
secret, the users which are already connected to that ac-
cess point are not disconnected. Moreover, the transmission
of C = ABEΠ(KW ) in the IEEE 802.11 information ele-
ments of the beacons can be encoded using fountain coding
(§ Section 2). In this way if the size of C exceeds the maxi-
mum size of a single information element, it can be encoded
into smaller droplets. The user can obtain C by captur-
ing enough of these droplets and using fountain (de)coding.
Figure 3 sketches the proposed format of the Information El-
ements contained in the beacons emitted by the access point.
The first fields are employed as specified in the IEEE 802.11
standard [5], i.e. the Element ID (one octect) contains the
value 221, assigned to Vendor-Specific Element IDs; the field
length (one octect) is set to the aggregated size of the sub-
sequent fields; and OUI (three octects) should contain an
identifier assigned by IEEE, but for experimentation pur-
poses is temporarily set to an arbitrary (unassigned) value.
The index field (one octect) is incremented modulo 256 each
time that the AP changes the WPA2 secret, and is used by
Stations to discard collected droplets associated to WPA2
secrets which become invalid. The nchunks (one octect)
and seed (two octects) fields contain respectively the total
number of chunks in which C has been divided, and the
pseudo-random seed used for the current droplet. Finally
the data field (variable length) contains the actual droplet
data.
0 31
Element ID length OUI
OUI index nchunks seed
seed
data
(variable length)
Figure 3: Format of the Vendor Specific Informa-
tion Elements included in the IEEE 802.11 beacons
broadcast by the access point
3.2 Security Analysis
In our proposed system, the WLAN access point makes
use of the WPA2 link-level encryption protocol, so that the
access to the network requires knowledge of the pre-shared
key (PSK). While common deployment of WLAN systems
based on WPA2 remains vulnerable against password crack-
ing attacks due to the weakness of the password/passphrase,
we propose to generate a random key, of the maximum size
allowed by WPA2 at each successful connection so that it
cannot be easily guessed, at least assuming the usage of a se-
cure RNG algorithm in the system. However, this challenge-
like approach cannot be used without integration of an effi-
cient technology for the distribution of the key that is not
pre-shared, i.e., it is a priori unknown to the user. In or-
der to make possible for the users to retrieve the secret key
required to access the network by proving that they are au-
thorized, we exploit the CP-ABE scheme. CP-ABE allows
us to encrypt the PSK, defining a boolean access policy over
the attributes that the user must own in order to be able
to decrypt and retrieve the PSK. This strengthen the secu-
rity of actual WPA2-based systems building an access con-
trol mechanism for key distribution on top of it. Assum-
ing honest users that do not leak the CP-ABE secret key
to other users with the aim of satisfying the policy, it will
be impossible for an attacker to sniff or even forge packets
to obtain access to the network without having the creden-
tials required by the encryption policy. Indeed, the random
generated WPA2 key will be encrypted by means of the CP-
ABE scheme and decrypted only by the legitimate users who
are able to satisfy the policy.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
We have performed a Linux-based preliminary implemen-
tation of our proposed system, summarized in Figure 4. Al-
though this implementation has not yet been tested on ac-
tual embedded and mobile devices, we foresee no big obsta-
cles to its porting to at least other Linux-based operating
systems such as OpenWrt/LEDE for the AP part, and An-
droid for the STA part.
Note that our implementation did not require changes to
the Linux kernel, but only to userspace tools such as hostapd
and iw, integrated with an implementation of a custom vari-
ant of the fountain LT codes and bash scripts. For the CP-
ABE part, we are employing the implementation of [13] pro-
vided at [1]. Further details are given in the remainder of
this section.
Figure 4: WI-FAB implementation overview
Fountain Coding
We call FCE and FCD the implementations of the fountain
coding encoder and decoder. FCE continuously reads the
contents of a specific file and provides droplets to a con-
figured named pipe. Droplets include an index number, as
described in Section 3.1. When FCE is instructed to reload
the contents of the file, the index is increased. FCD performs
the inverse operation: it continuously reads droplets from
a named pipe and when is able to reconstruct the original
information it writes it to a file.
Access Point
The hostapd daemon is a highly configurable user space
IEEE 802.11 access point implementation that employs the
nl80211 Linux API. Its source code is publicly available
at [2]. Note that hostapd already provides a mean to con-
figure static Information Elements to be included in the
access point beacons. Our modifications to hostapd allow
to: 1) provide a dynamic stream of Information Elements
through a local named pipe, and 2) change the configura-
tion of the WPA2-PSK keys without restarting the demon
and without disconnecting the users that are already con-
nected. We have devised and implemented a bash script
that periodically:
• generates a new random 256 bit WPA2 key S
• encrypts S with CP-ABE using a configurable policy
and the supplied CP-ABE public key and stores it in
a file F
• configures S as a new WPA2-PSK secret on hostapd
• instructs FCE to reload F and to provide its droplets
to hostapd (through the named pipe).
In order to allow a reasonable time for the connection of the
users, we keep the last two generated WPA2-PSKs active at
the same time. This is possible as hostapd supports the use
of multiple coexistent WPA2-PSKs.
Figure 5: ECDF associated to the number of col-
lected beacons needed to reconstruct the encrypted
secret with and without fountain coding (FC)
Note that the above implementation is only an approxi-
mation of the scheme described in Section 3, as the WPA2
key is changed at regular intervals instead of being changed
each time a user successfully connects to the AP.
Station
iw is a configuration utility for wireless devices. Its source
code is publicly available at [3]. Among its features, it allows
to instruct the wireless driver to perform active and passive
scans and to output the results. We have performed minor
modifications to iw to change the way in which the IE con-
tained in the beacons are displayed. In the future we plan
to employ wpa_supplicant [4] instead, which is a standard
tool in Linux-based OS and Android OS, responsible for the
connection to IEEE 802.11 WLANs.
We have developed a bash script that runs iw based ac-
tive scans multiple times and sends its output through a
named pipe to FCD. When FCD has collected enough droplets
to reconstruct the contents of F , a decryption attempt, us-
ing CP-ABE and the configured secret key of the user, is
made1. If the decryption is successful (i.e. if the supplied
secret key of the user is associated to a set of attributes that
satisfies the policy configured at the access point), the de-
crypted WPA2-PSK secret is included in a wpa_supplicant
configuration file and a connection to the access point is
performed, without the need to interact with the user.
5. RESULTS
This section shows the effectiveness of the proposed solu-
tion in a real-world experimental setup in our lab. We are
employing laptops (on the same desk) with a Linux-based
OS running the implementation described in Section 4. The
wireless NICs employ the rt2800usb driver module. The
version employed for the CP-ABE tools is 0.11, while our
modified hostapd and iw are derived from versions 2.5 and
3.3, respectively. Unless explicitly stated, we have config-
ured at the AP a beacon interval of 102.4 ms (i.e. the default
value of hostapd) and a policy with four attributes.
In the first experiment, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of fountain coding as opposed to the approach of just divid-
ing the encrypted secret into numbered chunks. Figure 5
1Please note that this is the only configuration parameter
needed at the Station/client side
Figure 6: Time needed for the station to connect vs.
number of attributes in the AP policy
Figure 7: Time needed for the station to connect
vs. random WPA2 key regeneration interval (500
connection attempts for each regeneration interval,
policy with 4 attributes)
shows the empiric probability (on 1000 samples, i.e. station
connection attempts) of recovering the encrypted secret (di-
vided into 16 chunks) vs. the number of collected beacons.
Beacon collection make up the majority of the total time
needed by the station to successfully connect to the AP. Al-
though our fountain coding implementation has room for
substantial improvement, the performance increase of the
system is promising.
In the second experiment, we change the size of the policy
by varying the number of contained attributes. This changes
the size of the encrypted secret and thus the time needed for
the station to connect to the AP.
Figure 6 shows how the number of attributes affects the
performance, for a series of 500 connection attempts for each
set number of attributes. The size of the encrypted secret
depends on the number of attributes employed in the policy.
In the third experiment we modify the WPA2 key changing
interval and observe how this change affects the time needed
by the stations to connect to the AP. In Section 3.1 we pro-
pose to change the WPA2 secret each time a new station
successfully connects to the AP. The results shown in Fig-
ure 7 support the feasibility of this proposal.
6. CONCLUSION
We introduced a new attribute-based access control mech-
anism based on CP-ABE, called WI-FAB. We proposed to
employ our mechanism in the scenario of protected WLANs
and we implemented a working prototype. We finally showed
and discussed the results obtained in a real-world experimen-
tal setup.
In the future, we plan to extend the proposed approach
to leverage the multi-authority CP-ABE schemes. This will
enable federation scenarios in which multiple entities will
be able to issue attribute-based credentials to users. More-
over, we plan to investigate further the use of fountain codes,
optimizing their usage, the implementation and the em-
ployed parameters, as well as other alternative error cor-
rection mechanisms.
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